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Patent Law: Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.: How Can the Federal Circuit Control the
Doctrine of Equivalents Following the Supreme Court's
Refusal to Set the Standard?*
L Introduction
[T]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the
patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the
assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to
the public.'
Less than one year after announcing its commitment to ensuring certainty in
defining the scope of patents, the United States Supreme Court took a step toward
undermining that commitment in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co.2 Although the Court sought to clarif3 the proper scope of the doctrine of
equivalents,' the unanimous Court's opinion in Warner-Jenkinson fails to address the
concerns of inventors, businesses and the patent bar regarding application of the
doctrine. This note analyzes the policy considerations underlying the patent system
and the doctrine of equivalents to propose a revised inquiry striking a balance between
the competing considerations in doctrine of equivalents cases.
In the United States, patent infringement may occur either when an accused device
or process literally infringes the claims of the patente or through application of the
judicially-developed doctrine of equivalents. Infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents differs from literal infringement in that under an equivalents theory,
infringement may be found even though the infringing device or process falls outside
the scope of the claims of the patent.6 Since 1950, the primary analysis applied for
determining whether there was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents has been
* This Note was awarded second prize in the 1997 George Hutchinson Writing Competition
sponsored by the Federal Circuit Bar Association.
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1996) (quoting General Elec.
Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)).
2. 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
3. See id. at 1045.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. Literal infringement of a patented invention occurs when a person "without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. 1 1995). To obtain a patent, the
inventor must submit a specification detailing one or more claims "particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
Because the claims define the scope of the patented invention, literal infringement occurs when the
accused invention falls within the patent claims. See Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962
F.2d 1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
6. See Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the test announcel by the United States Supreme Court in Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co The Graver Tank "triple identity" or
"function-way-result" test provides that a patentee may prove infringement if the
accused device "performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the sane result" as the patented invention.!
As one of its defects, the Warner-Jenkinson opinion leaves open the question of
whether the triple identity test continues to be determinative of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. Moreover, the Court failed to provide any specific guidance
as to how the lower courts should determine "equivalence" within the doctrine.
Instead, the Court merely instructed the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to develop a test through a series of "case-by-case determinations."9
This note addresses the development and application of the doctrine of equivalents
in patent infringement cases, with particular emphasis on Warner-Jenkinson. Initially,
this note examines the doctrine, analyzing from an historical perspective, the broad
range of interpretations courts have given. Second, this note recounts the facts and
holdings of Warner-Jenkinson, illustrating the variety of issues addressed by both the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.'" Third, the Supreme Court's opinion is
analyzed to demonstrate its inherent shortcomings together with its proper conclusions.
Fourth, recognizing the potential breadth of the doctrine of equivalents, this note
proposes a test to the Federal Circuit for limiting the doctrine. In conclusion, this note
analyzes the proposed test and determines that the policy considerations underlying
both the doctrine of equivalents and the patent system as a whole support the proposed
limited inquiry.
II. Evolution of the Doctrine of Equivalents
Unlike current law which requires patent specifications to include claims particularly
and distinctly describing the extent of the invention," the original Patent Acts of 1793
required only a general description.'2 Under the original patent law, the government
issued the patent upon the inventor's description so as to "distinguish the [invention]
from other things before known."'3 Accordingly, the scope of the description was so
broad that courts determined infringement if the accused device was "substantially, in
[its] principles and mode of operation, like" the patented invention. 4
7. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
8. Id. at 608 (qucting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
9. Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
10. At the Federal Circuit, the caption of the case was Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co. When discussing the circuit court's opinion, this note will refer to the case as Hilton
Davis. However, because Warner-lenkinson was the petitioner at the Supreme Court, the order of the
parties in the caption was reversed. Accordingly, this note will refer to the Supreme Court's opinion as
Warner-Jenkinson.
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
12. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22.
13. Id. § 3, 1Stat. at 321.




Because of a recognized need for the public to be made aware of the extent of
granted patents, Congress, in 1836, prescribed the requirement that patent applications
include claims for the inventions.'" Following Congress' mandate that patent
applications include claims of invention, the Supreme Court in 1853 first recognized
the need for the doctrine of equivalents in Winans v. Denmead.6 In Winans, the
patentee had invented a conical-shaped railroad car for transporting coal. The alleged
infringer incorporated the patentee's tapered design but used a car having an octagonal
rather than a circular cross-section. Applying the doctrine of equivalents, the sharply
divided Court held that through the patent description, the patentee protects "not only
the precise forms he has described, but all other forms which embody his inven-
tion."'7 On the other side, the four dissenting justices argued that the statutory
requirement of detailed description mandated that the courts refrain from finding
infringement beyond the bounds of the claim."
Nearly one hundred years later, the Supreme Court repeated the same opposing
views in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.'9 In Graver
Tank, the plaintiff held patents for multiple electric welding compositions or fluxes.
The claims disclosed in the patent described the product as a flux "containing a major
proportion of alkaline earth metal silicate."'  The defendant's products included
silicates of calcium and manganese instead of silicates of calcium and magnesium.
Manganese is not an alkaline earth metal2' as specified in the patent claim. Therefore,
the accused products fell outside the patent claims, and there was no literal
infringement.
The Graver Tank Court reaffirmed the doctrine of equivalents, stating that the
policy supporting the doctrine was to prevent "fraud on a patent."' The Court
restated the test for infringement under the doctrine by providing that '[t]o temper
unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention' a
patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the
same result.'"" The Court further specified that equivalency must be determined in
context with the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the individual
case.2
15. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (requiring that the inventor "particularly
specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or
discovery").
16. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
17. Id. at 342.
18. See id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting). Essentially, the dissenting justices argued that Congress
required the patentees to set forth their claims of invention, and the courts should limit infringement to
devices falling within the scope of the claims.
19. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
20. Id. at 613 (Black, J., dissenting).
21. The "alkaline earth metals" are the "[d]ivalent metals of Group II of periodic table; beryllium,
magnesium, calcium, strontium, barium, and radium." THE CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICTIONARY 39 (6th
ed. 1961).
22. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
23. Id. (footnote omitted).
24. See id. at 609. The Graver Tank Court stated that when determining infringement under the
1997]
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Within the factual context of the case, the Graver Tank Court determined that
application of the doctrine of equivalents turned on whether the substitution was
substantial.' The Graver Tank Court reviewed the evidence and determined that
because persons skilled in the art would have known that the substituted materials
would have little effect on the welds, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's determination that the substitution of materials constituted an insubstantial
difference.'
Because of problems with forum-shopping, Congress created the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 The Federal Circuit has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in certain types of cases, including appeals in patent infringement
cases.' Notwithstanding Congress' intent to bring more uniformity into the patent
system,' the Federal Circuit was unable to develop a consistent application of the
doctrine of equivalents." Accordingly, "to the displeasure of many patent prac-
titioners, the doctrine of equivalents [has been] mired in considerable ambiguity and
uncertainty.' 
l
In an attempt to resolve some of the problems with its application of the doctrine
of equivalents, in 1995, the Federal Circuit granted an en banc rehearing of Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.32 The court split seven-to-five on how
to apply the doctrine, and the case resulted in five opinions spanning seventy pages
in the Federal Reporter.3 Immediate reaction to the decision suggested that the
Federal Circuit's widely divergent views meant that the decision "[did not] resolve a
thing."' Accordingly, some commentators believed that the appropriate way to
achieve resolution of the issues was for the Supreme Court to hear the cases
I1. Statement of the Case
In 1982, the Hilton Davis Chemical Co. began research into the development of an
ultrafiltration proces for purifying certain food, drug, and cosmetic dyes. 6
doctrine of equivalents, "[aln important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have
known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was." Id.
25. See id. at 610.
26. See id. at 611-12.
27. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25, 25
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
29. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12.
30. See generally Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of Federal
Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM. MrCHELL L. REv. 1033 (1994).
31. Id. at 1034.
32. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
33. See id. at 1512-32.
34. Victoria Slind-Flor, Infringement Equivalence a Jury Question, but Split Court Left Key Patent
Issues Unresolved, Nxr'et LJ., Aug. 21, 1995, at A6 (quoting Herbert F. Schwartz, patent attorney with
Fish & Neave).
35. See id. ("The fact that this court is so philosophically divided suggests that [the Supreme Court]
ought to look at it.") (statement of Herbert F. Schwartz) (alteration in original).




Ultrafiltration uses osmosis to separate components of a solution by drawing some of
the components through a membrane." Hilton Davis completed successful tests of
the process in October 1982 and January 1983. Subsequently, Hilton Davis filed a
patent application.
During the prosecution of the Hilton Davis patent application, the patent examiner
objected to a perceived overlap with an existing patent for an ultrafiltration process
which operated at a pH level of above 9.0?' In response to the objection, Hilton
Davis modified its claim language to limit the claim for the process operating "at a
pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0." 0 It remains unclear why Hilton Davis included
the lower 6.0 pH limitation in the claim.4' Following the amendment, the Patent &
Trademark Office issued the patent to Hilton Davis in 1985.42
While Hilton Davis was developing its process, the Wamer-Jenkinson Co.
independently experimented with an ultrafiltration process in 1982. In fact, Warner-
Jenkinson tested its process prior to the Hilton Davis tests. However, Wamer-
Jenkinson's tests failed, and the company temporarily abandoned the research. In 1986,
Warner-Jenkinson renewed its research and successfully developed an ultrafiltration
dye purification process.
The Hilton Davis and Wamer-Jenkinson processes are similar in that each includes
ultrafiltration through a membrane. The Wamer-Jenkinson process operates at gage
pressures from 200 to 500 pounds per square inch at a pH of 5.43 The claim
disclosed by the Hilton Davis patent states that Hilton Davis' process operates at gage
pressures between approximately 200 to 400 pounds per square inch at a pH of
between approximately 6.0 and 9.0.
44 Because the pH of the solution in the Warner-
Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515-16.
37. See id. at 1515.
38. The pH of a solution is a measure of the acidity or basicity of the solution. See THE
CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICrIONARY 725 (7th ed. 1966). The pH values run from 0 to 14 on a loga-
rithmic scale with 7 representing neutrality, numbers less than 7 representing increasing acidity, and
numbers greater than 7 representing increasing alkalinity. See EUGENE P. SCHOCH & WILLAM A.
FELSING, GENERAL CHEMISTRY 305-07 (1938).
39. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1045-46 (1997).
40. Id. at 1045.
41. See id. at 1046 & n.2. Warner-Jenkinson, the alleged infringer, claimed that Hilton Davis
included the 6.0 pH limit because its process created "foaming" which precluded the process from
working effectively at lower levels. See id. at 1046 n.2. In response, Hilton Davis stated: "the patented
process was successfully tested to pH values as low as 2.2 ... with no effect on the process because of
'foaming.'" Respondent's Brief at 34 n.34, Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997) (No. 95-728).
42. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
43. See id. at 1516.
44. As recounted by the Federal Circuit, the claim at issue provides in pertinent part:
In a process for the purification of a dye selected from [a group including Red Dye # 40
and Yellow Dye # 6] ... the improvement which comprises: subjecting an aqueous
solution.., to ultrafiltration through a membrane having a nominal pore diameter of 5-15
Angstroms under a hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 ps.i.g., at a pH from
approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to thereby cause separation of said impurities from said
dye ....
1997]
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Jenkinson process fell outside the range included in Hilton Davis' patent claim, there
could be no literal infringement 5 However, the trial court submitted the case to the
jury under instructions incorporating the Graver Tank triple identity test to determine
if there was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found that
Warner-Jenkinson had infringed the Hilton Davis patent 7
A. Decision of the Federal Circuit'
In granting an en banc review of the Hilton Davis49 case, the Federal Circuit
sought to resolve three issues, First, the court undertook to establish whether a finding
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires more than satisfaction of the
triple identity test.O Second, the court attempted to determine whether application of
the doctrine is within the trial court's discretion based upon the facts and circumstan-
ces of the individual case' Third, the court sought to determine whether the doctrine
is an equitable remedy, precluding the right to a jury trial.-"
Id. at 1515 (alteration and first and second omissions in original) (emphasis omitted).
45. Prior to trial, "Hilton Davis conceded that there was no literal infringement." Warner-Jenkinson,
117 S. Ct. at 1046.
46. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1523.
47. See id at 1516.
48. A thorough discussion of the Federal Circuit's decision is necessary because it set the framework
for the Supreme Court's analysis. Moreover, the Federal Circuit made several determinations regarding
the doctrine of equivalent; which the Supreme Court refused to address.
49. Recall that this note will refer to the circuit court decision as Hilton Davis and the Supreme
Court's opinion as Warner-Jenkinson, See supra note 10.
50. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
51. See id. Prior to Hilton Davis, there was a great disparity among the Federal Circuit judges as
to the scope of the doztriie. Some cases concluded that a patent holder is permitted to pursue an in-
fringement action under ai equivalents theory only in exceptional cases. For example, one panel of the
Federal Circuit stated:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the rule, for
if the public come; to believe (or fear) that the language of the patent claims can never
be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every
infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the
claims, then claim7 will cease to serve their intended purpose.
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). However, the London court's
interpretation of the doctrine's application appeared to contradict the Supreme Court's guidance. See, e.g.,
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 516, 556 (1871) ("Patentees... are entitled in all cases to
invoke to some extent the doctrine of equivalents . . . .") (dictum).
52. Prior to Hilton Davis, some courts characterized the doctrine of equivalents as an "equitable"
doctrine. See, e.g., Charles. Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
courts labeling the doctrine as an equitable remedy focused on the policies underlying the doctrine and
concluded that judges cirated the doctrine using their equitable powers in order to prevent the
unscrupulous copyist from causing a "fraud on a patent." See, e.g., Charles Greiner & Co., 962 F.2d at
1035-36.
53. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be F reserved. .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In deciding whether the Seventh




1. Expansion Beyond the Triple Identity Test
After reviewing the history of the doctrine of equivalents, the Hilton Davis court
stated that it was merely restating, not revising, the test under the doctrinel The
court concluded that "a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
requires proof of insubstantial differences between the claimed and accused products
or processes."55 Although the Hilton Davis court adopted this "insubstantial
differences" test, the court recognized that in many cases, the Graver Tank triple
identity test will suffice "to assess equivalency because similarity of function, way,
and result leaves little room for doubt that only insubstantial differences distinguish
the accused product or process from the claims."
However, the court determined that "evidence beyond function, way, and result
is also relevant to the doctrine."' The Federal Circuit held that in certain instances,
the intent of the alleged infringer is relevant in determining whether there is infrin-
gement under the doctrine of equivalents."6 The court emphasized that that intent
plays no role in determining whether to apply the doctrine; intent is only relevant
to whether the differences between the claims and the accused product or process
are insubstantial.9 Accordingly, the court concluded that evidence of independent
development is irrelevant to finding infringement because such development is
unrelated to the substantiality of the differences between the claims and the accused
product or process.'
2. Trial Court's Discretion in Invoking the Doctrine
In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of equivalents served
the purpose of preventing the unscrupulous copyist from making "unimportant and
insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent" in order to avoid liability for
infringement.6' The Court added that "[t]he essence of the doctrine is that one may
not practice fraud on a patent."' Moreover, the Court recognized that the doctrine
the action falls within "Suits at common law." See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). To
aid in such determination, the Supreme Court has provided that actions which "are analogous to 18th-
century cases tried in courts of equity or admiralty do not require a jury trial." Id. Consequently, if the
doctrine of equivalents were merely an equitable remedy, there would not be a constitutional right to a
jury trial.
54. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
55. Id. at 1521-22 (emphasis added). The court asserted that it had "stressed the significance" of
the "insubstantial differences" standard in prior decisions. See id. at 1517.
56. Id. at 1518.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 1519 (holding that evidence of copying is relevant in determining whether "the dif-
ferences between the claimed and accused products or processes - measured objectively - are
insubstantial"); id. at 1520 (holding that evidence of "designing around" patent claims supports a finding
that the changes made are substantial).
59. See id. at 1519-20 (rejecting arguments that the Graver Tank Court's statements of the doctrine's
purpose to prevent "fraud on a patent" limited application of the doctrine to cases where there was
evidence that the alleged infringer intended to copy the product or process).
60. See id. at 1520.
61. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
62. See id. at 608. The Court's use of the word "fraud" emphasizes the relevance of the alleged
19971
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of equivalents is "available for utilization when the proper circumstances for its
application arise."63 With the Graver Tank Court's policy analysis and Federal
Circuit precedents limiting application of the doctrine to cases involving copying
with incorporation of insubstantial modifications," the Federal Circuit sought to
clearly define the extent to which a patentee can invoke the doctrine.'
Despite concerns about widespread application of the doctrine,' the Hilton Davis
court summarily concluded that the trial judge has no discretion in whether to apply
the doctrine of equivdents. 7 The court relied on dicta in Supreme Court cases to
determine that "eve,y patent owner is entitled to invoke the doctrine of
equivalents."' This position drew sharp criticism from the dissenting judges at the
Federal Circuit. Judge Lourie concentrated on Graver Tank's references to piracy,
stating:
The whole purpose of the doctrine is to defeat piracy and to do justice
to a patentee. A pirate is one who intentionally copies a patented
product, making only the most minor change to avoid literal infrin-
gement. An innocent developer who unintentionally happens to come
close to the claims of a patent should be treated differently.'
In addition, Judge Nies quoted directly from Graver Tank which suggested that
some evidence of copying was required before the court should apply the doctrine
of equivalents:
It is difficult to conceive of a case more appropriate for application of
the doctrine of equivalents.... Without some explanation or indication
that [the accused product] was developed by independent research, the
trial court could properly infer that the accused [product] is the result
of imitation rather than experimentation or invention."
infringer's intent to the polizies supporting the doctrine of equivalents. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
660 (6th ed. 1990) (noting that "fraud," "[als distinguished from negligence .... is always positive,
intentional).
63. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[W]here
an infringer, instead of inventing around a patent by making a substantial change, merely makes an
insubstantial change, essentially misappropriating or even 'stealing' the patented invention, infringement
may lie under the doctrine of equivalents.").
65. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516 ("Is application of the doctrine of equivalents by the trial
court to find infringement of the patentee's right to exclude, when there is no literal infringement of the
claim, discretionary in accordance with the circumstances of the case?").
66. See supra note 51.
67. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
68. Id at 1521 (citing Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929); Seymour v.
Osborne, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 516, 556 (1871)).
69. Id. at 1548 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
70. Id at 1577 (Nies, J., dissenting) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339




3. Right to a Jury Trial
Hilton Davis was the second of two important patent cases involving issues of the
roles of the judge and jury decided by the Federal Circuit in 1995. In the first of
the cases, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,. the court held that the
interpretation of the patent claims is an issue of law to be determined by the
judge.' In Hilton Davis, the court sought to resolve whether infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents is an issue to be resolved by a jury.' Rather than
making the inquiry as to whether the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury
trial,74 the Federal Circuit flatly assumed that because infringement presents
questions of fact,75 a jury must make the doctrine of equivalents inquiry in cases
tried before a jury.76
B. Decision of the Supreme Court
Recognizing the sharp disagreement within the Federal Circuit regarding the
doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and sought "to clarify
the proper scope of the doctrine."' The importance of the decision to patent
owners and the patent bar is evidenced by the seventeen amicus briefs filed in the
case. The Court reversed and remanded the case,' but the Court discussed much
71. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
72. See id. at 970-71. The interpretation of valid patent claims is the first step in a two-part analysis
for infringement. Before determining whether the accused product or process infringes the patent, there
must be a determination of the meaning of the claim language. See Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1388 (1996). In literal infringement cases, the second step, that of determining
whether the accused device or process falls within the limits of the patent claims, has long been
recognized as being within the province of the jury. See, e.g., United States v, Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S.
201, 205 (1936).
73. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
74. See discussion supra note 53.
75. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
76. See id. at 1525. At least one district court would disagree with the Federal Circuit's analysis.
In Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Industries, 835 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Mich. 1993), rev'd on other grounds,
53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the court analogized the doctrine of equivalents as the reformation of a
contract. See Transmatic, 835 F. Supp. at 1029. Applying the test announced by the Supreme Court for
whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial, see supra note 53, the Transmatic
court concluded that because reformation of a contract was an equitable decision, the parties did not have
a right to a jury trial. See Transmatic, 835 F. Supp. at 1028.
In Warner-Jenkinson at the Supreme Court, Hilton Davis and many of the amici urged the Court to
decide the issue regarding the right to a jury trial. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
117 S. Ct. 1040, 1053 (1997). The Court, however, refused to pass on the issue, concluding that the
Federal Circuit's determination of the issue had sufficient support from Supreme Court precedent. See
id.
77. Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1045. The single question before the court was "[w]hether
patent infringement exists whenever the accused product or process is 'equivalent' to the invention
claimed in the patent, in that the differences are not 'substantial' as determined by a jury, even though
the accused product or process is outside the literal scope of the patent claim." Petitioner's Brief at i,
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728).
78. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
19971
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more about the doctrine of equivalents than was necessary to reach that result. As
with the Federal Circuit's decision, the early reaction to the Supreme Court's opinion
suggested that the Court clarified little about the doctrine."
IV. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decision
Perhaps because of the many conflicting issues raised by the parties and amici,
Justice Thomas' opinion for the Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.' meanders through the doctrine of equivalents, uncovering many
questions, but answering very few. In fact, the Court's basis for reversing the case
was the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel," an issue only summarily dis-
cussed by the Federal Circuit."2 Perhaps the most positive aspect of the Court's
opinion is the determination that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied on an
element-by-element basis, rather than applied to the invention as a whole.83
Although the limitation of the doctrine to equivalent "elements" somewhat
narrowed the potential scope of the doctrine, the remainder of the Warner-Jenkinson
opinion provides little direct guidance to the lower courts with respect to the
doctrine's application. Rather than following Justice Thomas' opinion from issue to
issue, this note concentrates primarily on the appropriate standard for equivalence
within the doctrine of equivalents.
A. The Doctrine of Equivalents Survived the Patent Act of 1952
Congress is the body which is entrusted with the authority to make the patent
laws." In exercising this authority, Congress has mandated that the patent
79. See generally Victoria Slind-Flor, High Court Punts on Equivalents, NA'Vt LJ., Mar. 17, 1997,
at A6. "Mhe ruling is a case of 'these guys throwing the issue over the fence to those guys and those
guys throwing it back again."' Id. (quoting Robert P. Merges, Professor of Law at Boalt Hall School of
Law, University of California-Berkeley).
80. 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
81. See idL at 1054. Prosecution history estoppel, or "file-wrapper estoppel," applies in situations
where, during the prosecution of the patent application, the patentee made amendments to the patent
claims. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In a
subsequent infringement action, prosecution history estoppel bars the patentee "from contending later in
an [equivalents] infringement action that his claims should be interpreted as if limitations added by
amendment were not present." Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). In other words, when the patentee limits the scope of his claims by amendment in order to
receive the patent, the patertee may not thereafter use the doctrine of equivalents to regain the ground
surrendered by the amendment.
82. The Federal Circuit suggested that prosecution history estoppel was inapplicable to the case
because the modification to the patent claim, see supra text accompanying notes 38-40, was made to
avoid the prior art involving processes operating at pH levels above 9.0, while there was no patentability
reason for placing the lower pH limit of approximately 6.0. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1525. The
Federal Circuit held that the amendment of the claim "does not bar Hilton Davis from asserting
equivalency to processes ... operating sometimes at a pH below 6." Id. The circuit court's discussion
of prosecution history estoppel is limited to only one paragraph in the fifteen pages of the majority
opinion.
83. See Warner-Jenkinr on, 117 S. Ct. at 1044.




"specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his inven-
tion." '8 The statute provides that infringement occurs when someone "without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention ....
Nowhere does the Patent Act even mention the doctrine of equivalents.'
Recognizing that the last time the Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of
equivalents was in 1950 in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co.,88 Warner-Jenkinson first argued that the Patent Act of 19529
terminated the doctrine. ° Specifically, Warner-Jenkinson stated that "[t]here is
nothing whatever in the 1952 Act, or in any legislative history, endorsing Graver
or otherwise indicating that the standard for infringement protects a patent monopoly
defined with reference to 'equivalents,' beyond the construed meaning of the patent
claims."' The Court, however, rejected Wamer-Jenkinson's argument, emphasizing
that "[i]n the context of infringement, [the Court] ha[d] already held that pre-1952
precedent survived the passage of the 1952 Act."'
Considering that the Supreme Court had recognized the doctrine of equivalents
for almost 150 years without any express congressional authority,93 the possibility
that the Court would find that the doctrine was foreclosed by the 1952 Patent Act
was remote. Even Warner-Jenkinson most likely did not expect the Court to
eliminate the doctrine of equivalents entirely.' Notwithstanding the continued
existence of the doctrine, the Court recognized that if the doctrine were applied
broadly, it could conflict with the policies underlying the claiming requirements of
the Patent Act.95 A common fear is that, if interpreted broadly, infringement by the
doctrine of equivalents would become the rule rather than the exception."
The Supreme Court recognized well over a century ago that "the courts have no
right to enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claim as allowed by the Patent
Office .... When the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct (as they
always should be), the patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it."'
of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their...
Discoveries ....").
85. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
86. Id. § 271(a).
87. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Plager, J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
88. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
89. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (coidified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994)).
90. See Petitioner's Brief at 41-49, Warner-Jenkinson (No. 95-728).
91. Id. at 42.
92. Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1048 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
365 U.S. 336, 342 (1961)).
93. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
94. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1049 ("Understandably reluctant to assume this Court
would overrule Graver Tank, petitioner has offered alternative arguments ...
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
97. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877). The Warner-Jenkinson
Court reiterated this fundamental position. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1049 (quoting Hilton
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Unfortunately, the courts have defined the scope of patent claims in a manner which
makes it difficult to understand how the doctrine of equivalents can be applied
without enlarging protection beyond the claims.
1. Analogy Between Patent Infringement and Trespass to Land
Reference to the often-employed comparison between an infringement action and
a trespass action provides an illustration of the inherent difficulty in understanding
how the doctrine of equivalents fails to enlarge protection beyond the claims. The
courts have stated repeatedly that the patent claims define the "metes and bounds"
of the patent protection 0 This allusion to real property terminology conjures
images of the claim scope being specified on a plat defining precise limits." If an
accused device or process does not come within the limits defined on the plat, the
natural reaction is to assume that it must be outside the limits. In a sense, an
infringer is like a trespasser on the real property."t Upon initial consideration, the
doctrine of equivalents appears difficult to harmonize with the real property analogy
because, when the dcctrine of equivalents applies, the accused product or process
necessarily falls outside the patent claims."' If the realty analysis held true, the
doctrine of equivalents would always enlarge the scope of the patent claims because
it would allow infringement outside the originally-defined "metes and bounds."
2. Analogy Between Equivalents Infringement and Above-Surface Trespass
Applied in this manner, the real property analogy appears unsatisfactory.
However, when combined with American common law tort principles, the analogy
may provide a suitable concept for harmonizing the doctrine of equivalents and the
courts' characterization of patent scope. Continuing the comparison of a patent
infringer to a trespasser, the common law development of the vertical extents of a
landowner's possession rights" may offer guidance for the development of the
doctrine of equivalents.
Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1573-74 (Fed, Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997)).
98. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1989); Teledyne McCormick Selph v. United States, 558 F.2d 1000, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Straussler v.
United States, 290 F.2d 827, 831 (Ct. Cl. 1961). But see Smith v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 106 F.2d 622,
624 (8th Cir. 1939) ("Such boundaries never are and never can be defined in that definite sense which
we employ in thinking of physical things - they are not matters of metes and bounds.").
99. Although the "mtes and bounds" definition of patent scope provides a convenient reference,
the "boundar[ies] cannot be drawn with precision." Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168
F.2d 691, 693 (2d Cit. 1948) (L. Hand, J.).
100. "The claims become of utmost importance, for they are of the nature of metes and bounds and
describe for the world the area of the invention beyond which no one may go without trespassing."
Straussler v. United States, 290 F.2d 827, 831 (Ct. Cl. 1961); see also Hoechst-Roussel Pharms. v.
Lehman, 109 F.3d 756,759 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("With respect to direct infringement.... the claims define
the patent owner's property rights whereas infringement is the act of trespassing upon those rights.").
101. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1045 (1997).
102. See generally W. PAGE KEErON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW Op TORTS § 13,




Similar to a patent which "must describe the exact scope of an invention,""m a
deed to real property must provide a sufficient legal description of the property."M
The realty description will typically describe only the surface of the land."1 5
However, the common law grants to the landowner an exclusive property right in
some airspace above the surface." As such, the law protects an ownership interest
in intangible "space" even though such "space" is excluded from the legal
description of the property. This is closely analogous to the doctrine of equivalents
which protects, in some instances, the patentee's ownership interest in the patent."
The appropriateness of the above-surface trespass analogy becomes clear when
the competing interests in the airspace - and likewise in information outside the
scope of the patent claims - are examined. Although Lord Coke asserted that
"whoever has the land possesses all the space upwards to an indefinite extent,"103
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that such a proposition "has no
place in the modem world.""' ° Instead, "[t]he landowner owns at least as much of
the space, above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land."tt'
When an aircraft flies over a person's land, the inquiry into whether a trespass
occurs requires a balancing test considering the landowner's interest in the use and
enjoyment of the property and the public's right to use the airspace."' In the
doctrine of equivalents, the identical interests compete - the patentee seeks to
protect his interest in the patent, even though the accused device or process does not
fall within the specific language of the patent claims, while the alleged infringer
asserts the public's right to use information outside the scope of the patent claims.
Just as for the above-surface trespass, the analysis under the doctrine of equivalents
should include a balancing of competing interests. The policy considerations of the
doctrine of equivalents are discussed and applied to a proposed narrow interpretation
of the doctrine in part V of this note.
B. The Supreme Court Refused to Adopt a Test for the Doctrine of Equivalents
A fundamental question with which the Warner-Jenkinson Court wrestled was the
proper "linguistic framework" for determining "equivalence" under the doctrine of
103. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996).
104. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY § 11.2, at 723 (2d ed. 1984).
105. See generally id. § 11.2, at 723-31. However, a deed will rarely, if ever, describe the airspace
above the surface.
106. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 102, § 13, at 78.
107. Because patents have the attributes of personal property, see 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994), a patentee
acquires a property right in the power to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
108. Colin Cahoon, Comment, LowAltitudeAirspace: A Property Rights No-Man's Land, 56 J. AIR
L. & COM. 157, 161-62 (1990).
109. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
110. Id. at 264.
11I. Cf. Pueblo of Sandia ex rel Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045 & nn.1-2 (10th Cir. 1974)
(discussing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (first recognizing the balancing test), and
subsequent decisions refining the inquiry).
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equivalents."' The Court acknowledged that the appropriate test could depend on
the facts of the particular case."' Finding "no purpose in going further and micro-
managing the Fed-.ral Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing e-
quivalence,"' 4 the Court refused to define the proper inquiry under the doctrine
of equivalents."' :Instead, the Court instructed the Federal Circuit to call upon its
special expertise to refine the appropriate test through an "orderly course of case-by-
case determinations."
' 6
Because the Federal Circuit has had exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent
cases since 1982,"' it has naturally developed a substantial amount of precedent
in doctrine of equivalents cases."' The circuit court naturally combined such
precedent with its special expertise when it first decided Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co."' Accordingly, the Supreme Court's directive to the
Federal Circuit to "refine" its test for equivalence'" will likely have only minor
impact on the inquiry announced by the circuit court in Hilton Davis.' At most,
the impact of Supreme Court's opinion on the test under the doctrine of equivalents
will be limited to its express rejection of the Federal Circuit's conclusion that
evidence of "copying" or "designing around" was relevant to the determination of
112. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1054 (1997).
113. See id. The Court recognized that the Graver Tank "triple identity" test, see supra notes 7-8
and accompanying text, is often appropriate for mechanical patents but that its utility decreases when the
patent involves a proo-ss or another type of product. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
114. Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
115. See id.
116. ld.
117. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
118. From its inception until March 1997, the Federal Circuit mentioned the doctrine of equivalents
in 374 cases. Search of WVestlaw, CTAF database (Apr. 1, 1997).
119. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997). In
deciding the issue of the appropriate inquiry under the doctrine of equivalents, the Hilton Davis court
determined that "a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires proof of insub-
stantial differences betwen the claimed and accused products and processes." Id. at 1521-22 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court, however, noted that this "insubstantial differences" test "offers little
additional guidance as to what might render any given difference 'insubstantial.'" Warner-Jenkinson, 117
S. Ct. at 1054.
120. See Warner-Jerknson, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
121. Although the Fleral Circuit adopted the "insubstantial differences" test in Hilton Davis, see
supra note 119, the court's inquiry included much more than a mere statement that application of the
doctrine of equivalents requires that any differences be "insubstantial." The Hilton Davis court did not
choose the "insubstantial differences" test at the expense of "triple identity" (or "function-way-result")
test. See supra text accorpanying note 8. Instead, the court recognized that the triple identity test may
form part or all of the inquiry. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518.
However, the court concluded "evidence beyond function, way, and result is also relevant to the
doctrine of equivalents." Id. The court refused to place any limitation other than relevancy on the type
of evidence a party could admit in a case involving the doctrine. See id. at 1522. The court did
specifically recognize that evidence of "copying" or "designing around" may be relevant to the question
of whether the differences between the patent and accused device or process are insubstantial. See Id.




the substantiality of the differences between the patent and the accused product or
process.'"
As the Federal Circuit will most likely adopt some version of the "insubstantial
differences" test with the "triple identity" test embedded therein," unless the
Federal Circuit provides some additional guidance, trial courts will continue to
struggle with the factual determination of whether the differences are "insubsta-
ntial."'24 The person making such a factual determination will encounter either the
inherently vague adjective "insubstantial" with nothing more' , or "a formulaic
chant - function, way, result - which... provides little in the way of guidance,
and in some cases may be of no persuasive significance at all."'" Accordingly, the
Supreme Court's decision "brought little comfort to members of the intellectual
property bar."'"
V. A Proposed New Analysis Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
Any analysis under the doctrine of equivalents must address a number of
competing policy interests. Some courts have recognized that the fundamental
purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent a copyist from "stealing" an
invention by making only insubstantial changes to avoid the scope of the patent
claims." However, although the patent laws abhor such "copying," the patent
laws are designed to encourage, not just tolerate, persons to "design around"
patented inventions by making improvements incorporating substantial changes."
A broad application of the doctrine of equivalents creates a conflict because the
threat of an infringement lawsuit may deter persons from attempting to design
around valid patents because of the inherent uncertainty in the "insubstantial
differences" standard for equivalents infringement.
This section of this note first proposes a refinement of the doctrine of equivalents
in order to strike a compromise position between the competing policy interests.
122. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1052 ("The better view, and the one consistent with
Graver Tank's predecessors and the objective approach to infringement, is that intent plays no role in the
application of the doctrine of equivalents.").
123. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
124. The Supreme Court refused to consider whether application of the doctrine of equivalents is
for the jury or the court. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1053. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit's
determination "infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact to be submitted to the
jury in a jury trial" remains the law. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522. However, the courts must limit the
application of the doctrine according to the summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law rules
contained within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1053 n.8.
Moreover, the Supreme Court charged the Federal Circuit with the responsibility of ensuring that the
district courts do not abdicate their summary judgment obligations because of a lack of familiarity with
the subject matter of patent cases. See id.
125. Cf. Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1054 ("[IThe insubstantial differences test offers little
additional guidance as to what might render any difference 'insubstantial.").
126. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1537 (Plager, J., dissenting).
127. Slind-Flor, supra note 79, at A6.
128. See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
129. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520.
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This proposed inquiry satisfies the fundamental purposes of the doctrine, yet the
proposed test narrows the scope of the doctrine somewhat. Next, this section
analyzes the proposed test with respect to the policy interests and concludes that
such a narrowed inquiry better balances the competing interests than does the
Federal Circuit's current standard.
A. Equivalents of the "Best Mode" Disclosure and Actual Embodiments of the
Invention
When the Federal Circuit, en banc, decided Hilton Davis, one cause of the
division within the circuit was the debate as to whether there was an equitable
threshold which must be met before the court may apply the doctrine of
equivalents."' Although the approach concluding that such a threshold existed ap-
peared to find support from the Supreme Court's Graver Tank decision which
characterized the "essence" of the doctrine as a prohibition against "practic[ing] a
fraud on a patent,""' the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis concluded that "[t]he trial
judge does not have the discretion to choose whether to apply the doctrine of
equivalents when the record shows no literal infringement.""' On appeal, the
Supreme Court essentially agreed with the Federal Circuit's interpretation, stating
that the doctrine is not limited to only those cases where it will prevent copying and
piracy.
33
However, nowhere in Warner-Jenkinson did the Supreme Court require that the
definition of "equivalent" be consistent across the broad scope of a patent claim.
Moreover, the Court directed the Federal Circuit to use its "sound judgment" to
refine the test for equivalence."4 By adopting the narrowed test proposed in this
note, the Federal Circuit may be able to achieve a compromise position on the
doctrine of equivalents which both ensures broad protection for patentees and
prevents this judicially made doctrine from overbroad application.
1. Disclosures Required by the Patent Statute
Before presenting the proposed inquiry, some background on patent disclosures
is appropriate. The patent statute requires the patent applicant to include "one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."'13 As noted above, the claims define
the "metes and bounds" of the patent protection." However, the statute requires
disclosure of more than just patent claims. The applicant must provide a
specification "contain[ing] a written description of the invention and of the manner
130. See Peter K. Schalestock, Comment, Equity for Whom? Defining the Reach of Non-Literal
Patent Infringement, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 323, 333 (1996); see also supra note 51.
131. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
132. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
133. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1051 (1997).
134. See id. at 1054.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).




and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use the same."'37 In
addition, the specification must "set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention."''
This note proposes that the Federal Circuit should adopt an "insubstantial
differences" test in which the extent of "insubstantial" depends upon more than just
the patent claims. Instead, whether the accused device or process infringes under
the doctrine of equivalents should depend upon the patent specification, including
the "best mode" disclosure,'39 and actual embodiments of the invention made by
the patentee. It is axiomatic that a patent's claims will be broader than an
embodiment of the invention, whether that embodiment be the preferred em-
bodiment as provided in the specification or an actual embodiment developed by the
patentee."
2. Proposed Test for the Doctrine of Equivalents
Patent claims protect the patentee from literal infringement anywhere within the
metes and bounds disclosed by those claims.' As currently applied by the Federal
Circuit, the doctrine of equivalents requires comparison of the accused device to the
claims of the patent rather than to an embodiment of the invention.42 However,
this application fails to fully recognize all of the competing policy concerns
underlying both the doctrine of equivalents and the patent system in general. This
note suggests that the Federal Circuit should reconsider its position and emphasize
that the courts should be loath to find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
when the accused product or process is not equivalent to either the "best mode"
disclosure or to any actual embodiments made by the patentee which are available
to the alleged infringer.4 To accomplish this, the Federal Circuit should dictate
that the measure of "insubstantiality" for purposes of the doctrine of equivalents
should be at its highest when the accused device or process appears "equivalent" to
an actual or the preferred embodiment. Likewise, the court should require that the
measure of "insubstantiality" be at its lowest ebb where the accused product or
process appears to be "equivalent" to a patent claim, but not to an actual or the
preferred embodiment.
137. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
138. Id.
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
140. In his book on the mechanics of claim drafting, Robert Faber, like any lawyer seeking to
protect his clients' interests, advocates inclusion of patent claims which cover the invention as broadly
as possible. See ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING at X-1 (4th
ed. 1996).
141. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1579 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
142. See Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 739 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
143. See discussion infra part V(B). By "actual embodiments available to the alleged infringer," this
note refers to embodiments which are not identical to the "best mode" disclosure but which fall within
the scope of the patent claim. As discussed infra part V(B), one of the policy considerations underlying
the patent system is "notice" to the public. The proposed analysis' requirement that the actual
embodiments be "available to the alleged infringer" ensures that such notice function is satisfied.
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The Federal Circuit can ensure these goals by limiting the analysis under the
doctrine of equivalents to a comparison of the accused device or process to the
preferred or actual embodiments of the invention which are available to the alleged
infringer. However, it cannot be overemphasized that reference to the specification
and actual embodiments of the invention would apply only to the doctrine of
equivalents and would have absolutely no impact on defining the scope of the
invention.'"
3. Sample Application of the Proposed Inquiry
Before explaining the rationale supporting this proposition, an example of how
it might work in practice would likely be helpful. The facts of Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.' provide a useful illustration. In
Graver Tank, the patent claim involved in the dispute described the invention as a
flux "containing a major proportion of alkaline earth metal silicate."'" The
alkaline earth metals include beryllium, magnesium, calcium, strontium, barium, and
radium.47 In practice, the patentee produced and marketed a welding flux
containing silicates of calcium and magnesium, each of which is an alkaline earth
metal.'" On the other hand, the accused product was "similar to [the patentee's
product], except that it substitute[d] silicates of calcium and manganese - the latter
not an alkaline earth metal - for silicates of calcium and magnesium. W
49
Accordingly, the Court acknowledged that there was no literal infringement.'
Applying the proposed analysis to the Graver Tank facts, a court would compare
the accused device to the preferred and the actual embodiments available to the
alleged infringer.' Therefore, the court would inquire as to whether silicates of
calcium and manganese and silicates of calcium and magnesium are "equiva-
lents."'" In making this inquiry, the court would apply a refinement of the
"insubstantial differences" test."3
Assume, however, for purposes of this example, that the accused product
contained silicates of a metal other than manganese. Further assume that silicates
144. It is a basic piemise of Americain patent law that the claims, and not the specification, define
the scope of the invention. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1388 (1996).
Nothing in this note evn suggests that such is improper. Rather, this note suggests that when dealing
with the doctrine of equivalents, as opposed to literal infringement, the specification and actual
embodiments of the invsntion have relevance in the infringement analysis.
145. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
146. 1l at 613 (Black, I., dissenting).
147. See THE CONDENSED CHEMICAL Dic'rIoNARY 39 (6th ed. 1961).
148. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
149. Id.
150. See id at 612.
151. The patentu welding fluxes were marketed publicly by the patentee. Accordingly, the fluxes
were "available" to the alleged infringer.
152. Essentially, this was part of the inquiry made by the Graver Tank Court. The Court noted the
similarities of magnesium and manganese in addition to the relation between manganese and alkaline
earth metals in general. See id. at 610-11.




of this other metal, although the metal is not an alkaline earth metal, have properties
similar to those of silicates of barium, which is an alkaline earth metal. Under the
proposed inquiry, the court would not analyze the differences between the silicates
of this other metal and any of the alkaline earth metal silicates (i.e., barium).
Rather, the court would only compare the accused product's silicates to silicates of
calcium and magnesium as used in the patentee's actual embodiment. If the
differences between the accused product and the embodiments were insubstantial,
there would be infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, if such
differences were substantial, there would be no infringement notwithstanding the
fact that the silicates in the accused product have only insubstantial differences from
silicates of barium which fall within the scope of the patent claims.
B. Policy Analysis for the Proposed Inquiry Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
1. Background of Policies Supporting the Patent Laws and the Doctrine of
Equivalents
The policies underlying patent protection are diverse. One objective is to
encourage innovation.'" To accomplish this goal, Congress grants to the patent
owner the right to prohibit others from making, using or selling the patented
invention.' This monopoly power furnishes the inventor with the incentive to be
innovative because the inventor can be assured that he can prevent others from
reaping the rewards of his innovation and investment." However, in exchange for
this right to exclude, the inventor must disclose the invention in sufficient detail "as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, .. to make and use" the
invention." The public benefits from this disclosure through the increase in
information which is within the public domain.'5 In contrast, the patent owner
retains the right to exclude others from making, selling, or using the patented
invention for the term of the patent.'59 However, at the end of the patent term, the
entire invention joins the patent disclosures in the public domain.
In addition to these general policy considerations, the American system of patent
"claiming" has separate policy underpinnings. Because the patent claims define the
scope of a patent, those claims provide the requisite notice to others of what is
protected by the patent.m Accordingly, persons may take appropriate actions to
ensure that they do not infringe the patent."' Of course, the competing policy is
154. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
155. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
156. See Timothy J. Douros, Lending the Federal Circuit a Hand: An Economic Interpretation of
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 325 (1995).
157. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
158. See Douros, supra note 156, at 325.
159. The normal term of utility patents is 20 years from the date of application. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (1994).
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the protection of the. patent owner's interest in the invention." The doctrine of e-
quivalents poses a problem with respect to the "notice" function because the
doctrine necessarily only applies when the accused product is not within the scope
of the claims." While a potential infringer should be able to examine the patent
claims to determine whether the accused device or process falls within their bounds,
it is more difficult for the potential infringer to determine whether the accused
device or process is "equivalent" to the patented invention.
When the Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of equivalents in Winans
v. Denmead,'" it did so by only a 5-4 decision. The dissenting justices focused
on the statutory mandate that the patentee must "describe his invention, in such full,
clear, and exact terms, that from the description, the invention may be constructed
and used.'"" The dissenters concluded that both principles of legal interpretation
and the public interest required limiting patent scope to the language contained in
the patent claims." Consequently, the justices dissenting in Winans essentially
concluded that the language of the patent statute precluded the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
In spite of the concerns voiced by the Winans dissent, the doctrine of equivalents
has evolved without any express congressional approval in the patent statutes. The
Supreme Court, however, has continued to recognize the importance of the notice
function provided by the patent claims. 7 The obvious problem is that because the
doctrine of equivalents imposes liability for infringement outside the literal scope
of the patent claims, the doctrine tends to undermine the notice function provided
by the "claiming" requirement. Under the doctrine of equivalents, "people aren't
going to know the bounds of a patent... until the jury comes back with a
verdict."'" Concerns about increased litigation" under the doctrine of e-
162. See id.
163. See Judin v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 759, 785 (1993) ("The doctrine of equivalents is an
equitable doctrine, providing the patentee with a remedy when the claim does not read literally on the
accused device .... ").
164. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
165. Id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
166. See id. In reaching their conclusions, the dissenting justices noted:
Fulness, clearness, exactness, preciseness, and particularity, in the description of the
invention, its principle and of the matter claimed to be invented, will alone fulfil the
demands of Congress or the wants of the country. Nothing, in the administration of this
law, will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of
exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious demands, more injurious to labor, than a
relaxation of these wise and salutary requisitions of the Act of Congress.
Id.
167. See, e.g., Union Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) (recognizing
that the statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness protects against a "zone of uncertainty"
which would discourage enterprise and experimentation); Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60
(1931) (stating that the required disclosures 'inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits
of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured
without a license and which may not").
168. Edward Felsenthal. Top Court Strengthens Patent Protection Against Similar, but Not identical,




quivalents after Warner-Jenkinson merely echo the warnings made by the Winans
dissenters 144 years earlier.7'
Related to the notice function of the patent claims is the need for uniformity in
patent interpretation. Less than one year before Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme
Court decided the case of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 1' In Markman,
the unanimous Court held that interpretation of patent claims is to be performed by
the trial judge rather than the jury." In reaching its conclusion, the Court
emphasized the "importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent.'1
Moreover, the Markman Court stated that unless a patent's scope is clearly
disclosed, "[t]he public [would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it,
without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights."'74
Notwithstanding these intertwined concepts of uniformity and notice, the Warner-
Jenkinson Court adhered to the doctrine of equivalents. "5 The Court acknowledged
that the doctrine may "conflict[] with the definitional and public-notice functions of
the statutory claiming requirement,"" but stated that such conflicts occur only
when the doctrine is applied broadly." The Warner-Jenkinson Court endeavored
to narrow the application of the doctrine of equivalents, but essentially determined
that a patentee is entitled to invoke the doctrine in every patent infringement
case.' However, the inherent ambiguity in the word "equivalent" makes it
difficult for one using information outside the patent claims to determine whether
he is infringing the patent under the doctrine of equivalents.'
Moreover, the failure of the notice function under the doctrine of equivalents is
heightened by the Warner-Jenkinson Court's refusal to pass on the Federal Circuit's
conclusion that equivalents infringement is a question for the jury."0 Although the
Warner-Jenkinson Court found support for the Federal Circuit's position,'' the
Supreme Court in Markman recognized that judges are in a better position than
juries to interpret patent claims." Because, under Markman, the judge must
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner).
169. See id.
170. See quotation supra note 166.
171. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
172. See id. at 1395.
173. IL at 1396.
174. Id. (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)) (alterations in original).
175. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1054 (1997).
176. Id. at 1049.
177. See id.
178. The Warner-Jenkinson Court stated that the district courts have an obligation to limit the
application of the doctrine of equivalents through partial or complete summary judgments. See id. at
1053 n.8. This is really a hollow victory for accused infringers because by the time they receive
summary judgment, they will likely have already been subjected to expensive and time-consuming liti-
gation defending their use of information in the public domain.
179. See Felsenthal, supra note 168, at B12.
180. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
181. See id.
182. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996).
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interpret the patent claims," the judge would likely be in a better position to
determine whether the differences between the patent and the accused product or
process are substantial."u
Given the Warner-Jenkinson Court's position, one operating just outside the limits
of a valid patent should reasonably expect to be haled into court to defend a patent
infringement lawsuit. Yet, this appears to contradict the patent statute's policy of
encouraging innovation by permitting patentees to "design around" valid patents.'"
Fears of infringement suits under the doctrine of equivalents may deter com-
petitorsi" from designing around existing patents.
2. Application of the Policy Considerations to the Proposed Inquiry Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents
With all of the competing policy interests, the Warner-Jenkinson Court
undoubtedly faced a challenge in trying to clarify the doctrine of equivalents.
Instead of essentially punting the issue back to the Federal Circuit,'7 the Court
could have resolved the issue by adopting the proposed test for equivalency which
compares the accusel device to the specification "best mode" disclosure and any
actual embodiments of the invention which were available to the alleged
infringer." Under this proposed inquiry, the policy concerns underlying both the
patent statute and the doctrine of equivalents merge to produce an application which
reasonably protects patentees while encouraging competitive innovation without
threat of continuous litigation.
The proposed test squarely meets the primary policy goal, that of preventing the
"unscrupulous copyist" from perpetuating a "fraud on a patent.""r Although it may
be theoretically possible to "copy" an invention from the patent claims, it is more
likely that a copyist would replicate the invention from an embodiment disclosed
in the patent specification or by reverse engineering an actual embodiment available
183. See id.
184. This conclusion derives from the essential fact that the judge must understand the technologies
involved in the patented device or process in order to properly construe the patent claims. If the
comprehension of the technology is beyond the capabilities of the jury, the jury is left to decide an issue
which may have significant financial consequences "based on a formulaic chant - function, way,
result - which ... provides little in the way of guidance, and in some cases may be of no persuasive
significance at all." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Plager, J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
185. Recognizing that the patent statute encourages "designing around" patents, the Hilton Davis
court stated:
The ability of the public successfully to design around - to use the patent disclosure to
design a product or process that does not infringe, but like the claimed invention, is an
improvement over the prior art - is one of the important public benefits that justify
awarding the patent owner exclusive rights to his invention.
Id. at 1520.
186. "Designing around 'is the stuff of which competition is made ....'" Id. (quoting State Indus.,
Inc. v. A.0. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
187. See Slind-Flor, supra note 79, at A6.
188. See supra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.




to the copyist. Because the proposed inquiry applies the doctrine of equivalents to
determine whether the differences between the accused device or process and the
patented invention's specification disclosure or any actual embodiments available to
the alleged infringer are insubstantial, the doctrine continues to protect against the
copyist who makes insubstantial changes in order to fall outside the scope of the
patent claims.
However, the proposed test recognizes that competing policy concerns require
limits on the doctrine of equivalents. Because'the patent laws not only tolerate, but
actually encourage designing around patents," the doctrine of equivalents must
be able to clearly distinguish copying from designing around. "Designing around"
necessarily involves some level of copying because it means "to use the patent
disclosure to design a product or process that does not infringe."'' The difference
between designing around and copying is merely that copying suggests that the
differences between the accused product or process and the patented invention are
insubstantial."g
The proposed inquiry of comparing the accused device or process to the "best
mode" disclosure and actual embodiments of the patented invention meets the
requirement of encouraging designing around while prohibiting copying because the
specification and actual embodiments, unlike the broad and general patent claims,
provide tangible references for comparison. The inventor trying to design around
a valid patent will be placed in a better position to evaluate whether the process or
device infringes the patent under the doctrine of equivalents." In addition to
striking a balance between the encouragement of designing around and the disdain
of copying, the proposed approach effectively precludes the patentee from
unreasonably broadening the claims through the doctrine of equivalents.
Likewise, under the patent system, that which falls outside the patent claims may
be used by the public.' Accordingly, the "insubstantial differences" test, in a
sense, serves as a balancing test between the public's interest in using the
technology outside the patent claims and the patentee's ights to patent protec-
tion.' Without question, the patentee's interest in protection from literal infrin-
190. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
191. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
bane) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
192. See id. at 1519.
193. Applied to the modified Graver Tank factual scenario, see supra text accompanying notes 152-
54, a party trying to design around the alkaline earth metal silicate welding flux patent would need only
determine whether the differences between its silicate and the calcium and magnesium silicates used in
the actual embodiment of the patented invention were substantial. The party would not, however, be
required to determine whether its silicate was equivalent to any other alkaline earth metal silicate.
194. Cf. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) ("Mhe public policy
which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the
invention.").
195. It is critical to remember that the discussion of this balancing test is limited solely to the
application of the doctrine of equivalents. The patentee can absolutely protect his invention from
infringement by drafting the patent claims such that these "equivalents" literally infringe the patent.
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gement is great across the entirety of valid patent claims because these claims
actually define the invention."
However, the equitable nature"9 of the doctrine of equivalents mandates that it
be applied to promote fairness to both the patentee and the public."' This fairness
aspect is what determines the results of the balancing test between the patentee's
rights and the public's interest. When the patentee discloses the "best mode" for
carrying out the invention in the specification, the inventor informs the public of the
inventor's preferred embodiment for making and using the invention. In addition,
when the inventor develops other embodiments and makes such embodiments
available to the public, the public is thereby informed of other efficient methods of
carrying out the invention.
With respect to the fairness aspect of the doctrine of equivalents, the inventor
obviously retains a strong interest in protecting against copying with insubstantial
changes. The public's interest, however, varies with the substantiality of the
differences between a technology outside the scope of the patent claims and the
specification preferred embodiment or any actual embodiments available to the
public. '" The public's interest, adopted by one making or using a product or
process similar to the patented invention, is at its nadir when the differences
between an embodiment of the invention and the accused device or process are
insubstantial. Accordihgly, in such a situation, fairness demands that the balancing
test weigh in favor of protecting the patentee's rights.
But as this level of difference increases due to more substantial variation from
the embodiment, the puiblic's interest in using unpatented technology increases. The
reasons for this increase include the patent system's goal of increased competition
through the encouragement of designing around valid patents.' More importantly,
however, is the public interest in being able to use unpatented technology without
fear of being sued for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. This policy
consideration is that which completes the support for the proposed inquiry under the
doctrine of equivalent;.
The public is not truly informed of the definition of the invention until the patent
claims receive interpretation. As the Supreme Court determined in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.,"' however, such an interpretation must be made by
196. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
197. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1173 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) ("mhe doctrine of equivalents has been ijudicially devised to do equity.'") (quoting Loctite
Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
198. In Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit clarified that the characterization of the doctrine as
"equitable" meant that the doctrine exists in order to promote general fairness. See Hilton Davis Chem.
Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 117 S.
Ct; 1040 (1997).
199. Nothing illustrater. this variation more clearly than the patent law's abhorrence of copying
(insubstantial changes), see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950),
but the law's, encouragement of designing around (substantial changes), see Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at
1520.
200. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520.




a judge in an infringement action. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized that "the claims of patents have become highly technical in many
respects as the result of special doctrines relating to the proper form and scope of
claims that have been developed by the courts and the Patent Office."' Given this
recognition of the difficulty of claim interpretation, the public faces an enormous
challenge in trying to determine at what point changes from patent claims
(statements which are difficult to understand without special training) become
substantial. However, those members of the public who are "reasonably skilled in
the art"' ' can be charged with the ability to determine the substantiality of
differences between the allegedly infringing product or process and any disclosed
or actual embodiments available to the alleged infringer.
Where a patentee pursues an equivalents infringement action because the accused
product or process makes only insubstantial changes from the patent claims (but
where the changes are substantial from the disclosed and actual embodiments), the
general fairness concern underlying the doctrine of equivalents is thwarted. One
seeking to design around a patent cannot know the true extent of the patent until the
claims are interpreted by a judge;' therefore, he risks being haled into court to
defend an infringement lawsuit for trying to design around a patent - "one of the
important public benefits" underlying the patent system.' In this situation, the
balancing test must find in favor of the public interest, and the doctrine of
equivalents should not reach this far.'
VI. Conclusion
In its effort to "clarify" the doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson, the
Supreme Court failed to alleviate many of the concerns regarding the doctrine. The
Court's opinion discusses a variety of issues arising under the doctrine, yet leaves
many important questions for the Federal Circuit to resolve. Perhaps the Court
believed that it had to speak with a unanimous voice because of the sharply divided
views of the Federal Circuit justices.' Regardless of the motives for the decision,
Warner-Jenkinson did little to quell fears that the doctrine of equivalents has been
expanded to the point that increased litigation is inevitable.'
202. See id. at 1395.
203. Id. (quoting William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46
MICH. L. REV. 755, 765 (1948)).
204. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
206. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
207. It bears repeating one more time that the inventor is not without a method for protecting his
rights. He should draft his claims as broadly as possible so that he can protect his rights through literal
infringement actions. However, he should not be permitted to use the doctrine of equivalents at the
expense of the public's interest near the fringes of the patent claims.
208. See Slind-Flor, supra note 79, at A6 (quoting Donald S. Chisum, Professor of Patent Law at
Santa Clam University School of Law).
209. See Felsenthal, supra note 168, at B12.
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As the Federal Circuit continues to refine the doctrine of equivalents, it should
develop a test which addresses the policy concerns underlying both the basic patent
laws and the doctrine of equivalents. The inquiry proposed within this note strikes
a balance among these concerns by limiting the doctrine of equivalents to an
examination of the substantiality of the differences between the accused device or
process and both the patent specification's "best mode" disclosure and any actual
embodiments of the invention available to the alleged infringer. The use of the
disclosed or actual embodiments rather than the patent claims for this comparison
provides one attempting to engage in the encouraged "designing around" of the
patent with tangible references from which he can determine the substantiality of
the changes made. When one makes changes which are substantial with respect to
these known references, the proposed doctrine of equivalents inquiry promotes the
public's interest in advancing technology through designing around because of the
reduced fear of being haled into court on an allegation of equivalents infringement.
Conversely, when the differences between the accused device or process and the
disclosed or available actual embodiments are merely insubstantial, the doctrine of
equivalents serves its function to protect the rights of the patent owner. In this
situation, the public's interest in using technology outside the scope of the patent
claims is diminished because the embodiments provide the tangible references which
enable the public to be warned of the insubstantiality of the differences. Where the
public has such ability to determine that the differences are insubstantial, an accused
infringer cannot deny the reasonableness of being sued under the doctrine of
equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents must incorporate a balance between the public's
interest in using technology outside the scope of patent claims and the patent
owner's right to protection against the use of his invention by one whose use
incorporates only insubstantial differences. Increased foreign competition in high
technology areas will likely encourage more liberalized use of public information
in order to advance American technology. t If the Federal Circuit fails to put
some practical limits on the doctrine of equivalents, inventors trying to advance that
technology through designing around existing patents may find themselves stymied
by increased litigation. Such an effect would necessarily undermine the patent law's
primary objective of "promot[ing] the Progress of... useful Arts.".2
Richard L Wynne, Jr.
210. At the time of thi; note's writing, Congress was considering a bill which would overhaul the
United States patent system. See H.R. 400, 105th Cong. (1997). Included in this bill is a provision
which, in most cases, would require public disclosure of the patent application 18 months after filing,
even though the patent would not yet have issued. See id. § 202.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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